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NOTES & COMMENTS
POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH AND SLOVAK
FEDERAL REPUBLIC: AN EXAMINATION OF THE




Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
(CSFR) have emerged as the most promising Eastern European loca-
tions for foreign investment.' This is due, in part, to the countries' geo-
graphic advantages, 2 but a more important factor is the aggressive atti-
tude of the people3 and of their governments toward economic and
political reform.4 This resolve, despite high inflation" and escalating un-
* J.D. Candidate, 1993, Washington College of Law, The American University
1. See Investment In Eastern Europe; Less Talk, More Action Please, THE ECON-
OMIST, Feb. 16, 1991, at 54 (identifying Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic (CSFR) as the recipients of the majority of investments in the re-
gion, due to their political stability and genuine commitment to economic reform).
2. See Catalysts, Not Saviors, Business in Eastern Europe, at 24, 25, in A Survey
of Business in Eastern Europe: Don't Give Up Now, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991,
at 64 [hereinafter Catalysts] (describing Eastern Europe's attractiveness as a gateway
to the immense Soviet market).
3. See Wierzbowski, Eastern Europe." Observations and Investment Strategies, 24
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 385, 386 (1991) (contrasting the attitudes toward reform in
these three countries with attitudes in other Eastern European countries, and citing
overwhelming rejection of communists in free elections in Poland, Hungary, and the
CSFR compared with freely-elected communist majorities in the other nations).
4. Id. at 385. There is a sharp distinction between the goals and methods of the
reform process in these three nations from the goals and methods in the other Eastern
European nations. Id. Poland, Hungary, and the CSFR seek to eliminate all vestiges of
their communist systems, develop full-fledged market economies, and join the European
Economic Community by the turn of the century, whereas the other Eastern European
nations seek to introduce free market elements to their economies, and to attract some
foreign investment, but appear unwilling to completely abandon their old ways. Id.
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employment,' has provided enough social and political stability to at-
tract the attention of foreign investors. Continued stability and enact-
ment of ever more liberal investment laws are necessary to convert this
attention into capital investments.
7
Each of these countries has taken a different approach to the prob-
lem of transforming centrally-planned economies into free market sys-
tems by implementing laws intended to facilitate foreign investment in
order to spur economic growth. These privatization and investment
laws continue to evolve as these Eastern European states struggle to
reform their economies.8
This Comment examines the current investment climate in the
CSFR, Hungary, and Poland through an analysis of the elements and
implications of their rapidly changing laws. Parts I, II, and III of this
Comment focus on the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland, respectively.
Each Part analyzes current laws governing the following areas: the for-
mation of Foreign Joint Ventures (FJVs);9 the multitude of license and
permit requirements; the protection of the investments of foreigners;
the complications arising from the conversion of currency; the repatria-
tion of profits earned by foreigners; tax incentives and other related tax
issues; and the conversion of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) into pri-
vate companies and private assets-a process which must occur before
a foreign investor may purchase or invest in a company in these na-
tions. 10 Part IV of this Comment identifies the most progressive posi-
5. See Tomorrow, Business In Eastern Europe, at 3, 4, in A Survey of Business in
Eastern Europe: Don't Give Up Now, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, at 64 [hereinaf-
ter Business in Eastern Europe] (discussing the high inflation that continues to plague
Eastern Europe).
6. Id. at 4.
7. See Catalysts, supra note 2, at 24-28 (describing the uncertainties and bureau-
cratic roadblocks which have created confusion and hesitancy among the throng of
anxious but uncommitted foreign investors in Eastern Europe). Foreign investment is
seen as a necessary catalyst to the transition to a market economy. Id. A recent study
estimates that, in order for per capita income in the Eastern European nations to catch
up to levels in EC countries, Eastern Europe will require investments equal to $420
billion annually for a decade. Id. This represents two-thirds of current gross national
product. Id.
8. See, e.g., infra notes 161, 169, 190 (citing three Polish foreign investment laws
enacted in less than three years).
9. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 753 (5th ed. 1979) (defining the term "joint
venture" as an association of persons jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise).
In an international or foreign joint venture, at least one of the partners is from a coun-
try that is foreign to the country of the target market. Jesse, International Joint Ven-
tures, C536 A.L.I.- A.B.A., July 9, 1990, at 403.
10. See Business in Eastern Europe, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing the importance
and difficulties of converting state-owned enterprises into private companies). Although
Eastern Europe is highly industrialized, economic growth will not be achieved without
a massive move toward private ownership. Id. Western economists have produced many
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tion taken in each of the areas discussed, which, in most cases, is that
taken by Hungary in its foreign investment regime. The Comment con-
cludes with a call for acceleration of the privatization of state-owned
assets in these countries in order to release the force of private owner-
ship in the process of reforming their economies.
I. CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The CSFR has taken a slower approach to the transition to a market
economy" than have Poland and Hungary.12 Nevertheless, the CSFR
is committed to a comprehensive free-market reform program which is
well underway.' 3
useful ideas, but they have also confirmed that there is no single route to privatization
on such a large scale. Id. The current state-owned system does not adequately match
the right people to the right jobs. Id. Employees and managers of state-owned compa-
nies have very little incentive to improve the efficiency of their companies. Id. at 10.
They are assured of employment and obtain no benefits from improved profitability. Id.
11. See I BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE
EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT (P-H) § 5.01 at 5-3
(1990) [hereinafter BUSINESS VENTURES] (commenting on the CSFR's unique path to-
ward economic reform). The CSFR's communist government was more rigid and cen-
tralized than those of other Eastern European nations, and it fell more quickly. Id. As
a result, there was no gradual loosening of economic control before the "velvet revolu-
tion," and no well-organized opposition ready to implement change. Id. In addition,
socialist the CSFR had achieved tolerable living standards, so the desire to reform
lacked the urgency of Poland's reform program. Id.
12. See Comment, Perestroika in Eastern Europe: Four New Joint Venture Laws
in 1989, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1, 20 (discussing joint ventures in the CSFR).
The CSFR's joint venture laws are not as far reaching as those of Poland and Hun-
gary. Id. The principal reason for the CSFR's hesitancy is resistance by Czech officials
to embrace the new reforms taking place in Eastern Europe. Id. Privatization and For-
eign Investment in Czechoslovakia: The Legal Dimension, 24 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L.
305, 306 (1991). The slow pace in the CSFR is due to the rapidity of political reform
in 1989. BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, § 5.01 at 5-3. Unlike neighboring nations
which were experiencing devastating economic crises, the CSFR achieved political re-
forms without prolonged demonstrations. Id. Lacking the economic urgency of other
Eastern European nations, the CSFR has chosen to pursue a path toward economic
reform which is as smooth and painless as possible. Id. Unlike Poland and Hungary,
the CSFR has not yet established a stock market. Catch-22, Business In Eastern Eu-
rope, 5, 9, in A Survey of Business in Eastern Europe: Don't Give Up Now, THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, at 64 [hereinafter Catch-22].
13. See BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, § 5.01 at 5-4 to 5-5 (listing major
steps toward economic reform, including price liberalization, commencement of a
privatization program, and limited convertibility of the Czechoslovakian currency).
1992]
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A. PERMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING A FJV
The CSFR's Foreign Investment Act"' s tates that, prior to forma-
tion, all FJVs must receive authorization from the Federal Ministry of
Finance (FMOF),' 5 which, in turn, consults with the Ministry of Fi-
nance, Prices, and Wages of the republic in which the state-owned en-
terprise is located.'" The 1990 amendment to the Foreign Investment
Act greatly simplified the process of obtaining approval.17 Applications
to establish a FJV, however, must still include the following informa-
tion: (1) the name, seat, legal form and purpose of the proposed FJV;a'
(2) the name, seat, and occupation of investors;' 9 and (3) the initial
capitalization, share distribution, hard currency resources, and reserve
fund deposit20 of the proposed FJV. If more than one person partici-
pates in establishing the enterprise, a draft of the entity's bylaws and a
memorandum of agreement must accompany the authorization
application.'
Approval or denial of the application must occur within sixty days of
submission. Approvals are readily granted,23 and serve to authorize
activities which require licenses from the agencies which reviewed the
14. The Enterprise With Foreign Property Participation Act of 1988, as amended
by Collection of Laws, Act No. 112/1990 (Czech. 1990), translated in BUSINESS VEN-
TURES, supra note 11, at app. C-1.1 [hereinafter Czech Foreign Investment Act].
15. Id. at art. 5.
16. Id. The Czech and Slovak Federative Republic consists of two separate repub-
lics which are analogous to our own states. All investors should be aware of the need to
observe relevant republic laws in addition to federal laws. See BUSINESS VENTURES,
supra note 11, § 5.02(b)(2)-(3) at 5-16 (describing the roles of the national and repub-
lic governments in the review and approval of privatization plans).
17. Klein, Holec and Henzlova, Act on the Enterprise with Foreign Property Par-
ticipation, Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry, art. 6 (revised version,
1990), reprinted in BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, at app. C-l(1) [hereinafter
Investment Commentary]. The amended act eliminated a burdensome requirement that
applications for joint ventures include a feasibility study and permitted foreigners to
make the applications directly, without going through a Czechoslovakian citizen. Id. at
app. C-l(1), comments .12 -.13.
18. Czech Foreign Investment Act, supra note 14, at art. 6(1)(a).
19. Id. at art. 6(l)(b).
20. See id. at art. 12 (mandating the formation of a reserve fund equal to ten
percent of the initial capitalization of all enterprises, and requiring annual contribu-
tions to the fund of at least five percent of after-tax profits until the reserve require-
ment is satisfied, with an unspecified portion of the fund consisting of hard currency).
21. Id. at art. 6(2).
22. Id. at art. 7(3).
23. Id. at art. 7(l). Because the Foreign Investment Act only requires that the
proposed FJV have the hope of benefiting the Czechoslovakian economy, the govern-
ment may only withhold approval when a proposed venture has no hope of benefiting
the economy, (emphasis added). Id. Article 7(2) states that authorizations will not be
granted for entities proposing to engage in industries vital to the security and defense
of the CSFR. Id. at art. 7(2).
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application.24 Unlike the Polish investment law, governmental failure to
act on an application within the statutory period will not result in auto-
matic approval, 25 but the law does permit appeal of denials. 26
B. PROTECTION FROM EXPROPRIATION OF INVESTMENTS
The Foreign Investment Act states that FJVs may be expropriated 27
in accordance with Czechoslovakian law, 26 which prohibits expropria-
tion unless it is necessary for serious public reasons, and when less re-
strictive alternatives do not exist.29 If expropriation does occur, the
owner is entitled to compensation for the actual value of the loss.30
United States investors enjoy additional protections through a bilateral
investment treaty31 and a recent trade agreement between the United
States and the CSFR.
3 2
24. Article 8 provides:
An authorization granted to the prospective enterprise under Article 5 hereof
shall substitute all authorizations necessary for the respective type of economic
activity under specific rules of law, provided the authorizations under Article 5
hereof is [sic] granted by an authority who has the power to grant such authori-
zations to engage in said economic activities and the authorized type of economic
activity of the enterprise covers up [sic] such activities.
Id.
This provision eliminates the need to deal with the same agency more than once, and
is indicative of the new law's broader goal of facilitating the investment process. Invest-
ment Commentary, supra note 17, at C-1(1).14
25. New Polish Investment Law, infra note 175, at art. 18.
26. See BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, § 5.03(a), at 5-25 to 5-26 (discussing
the effect of the appeal provision in art. 7(3) of the Czech Foreign Investment Act).
Although the denial may be appealed, there is doubt as to the likelihood of relief given
the vague guidelines for administrative and judicial review. Id.
27. Czech Foreign Investment Act, supra note 14, at art. 22(1). The communist
governments of Eastern Europe originally obtained possession of companies and prop-
erty by taking assets from foreign and domestic owners during the late 1940s and early
1950s. See BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, at § 5.02 (describing the difficulty in
determining ownership of property confiscated by the government forty years ago).
Given this history of expropriation, it is important that the new democratic govern-
ments construct safeguards against the expropriation of new investments.
28. Czech Foreign Investment Act, supra note 14, at art. 22, § 1.
29. Id. See also Investment Commentary, supra note 17, at art. 22 (commenting
on the Czech Foreign Investment Act).
30. Czech Foreign Investment Act, supra note 14, at art. 22, § 2. The law permits
the voluntary conversion and repatriation of the proceeds from the expropriation settle-
ment. Id. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (noting that the CSFR has
designated requirements for currency convertibility).
31. Investment Incentive Agreement, Oct. 18, 1990, United States-Czechoslovakia
(entered into force upon signing in Prague, Oct. 18, 1990).
32. Agreement on Trade Relations, Apr. 12, 1990, United States-Czechoslovakia,
art. V, § 12, reprinted in BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, app. at C-12. The agree-
ment provides protection from unreasonable impairment of property rights. Id.
19921
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C. CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY
The CSFR enacted a new law on currency convertibility in Novem-
ber 1990.11 Prior to the new law, FJVs were required to sell thirty per-
cent of all hard currency34 earnings to the state.3 5 The new law requires
the conversion36 of all hard currency earnings into Czechoslovakian
korunas.37 FJVs, however, may obtain permits which allow them to
convert their korunas into hard currency in order to pay hard currency
obligations. 8 The government determines the official rate of conver-
sion." The net cost of selling, then buying back hard currency is ap-
proximately two percent, based on the differential between the selling
and purchasing rate. 0
D. REPATRIATION OF PROFITS AND WAGES
The CSFR no longer limits repatriation 41 of profits and gains from
sale or liquidations to the amount of hard currency reserves that an
33. Act on Foreign Exchange, Collection of Laws, Act No. 528/1990 (1990), re-
printed in BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11 app. at C-6 [hereinafter Czech Foreign
Exchange Act].
34. See R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON, J. SPANOGLE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANS-
ACTIONS 782 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing currency exchange controls). Hard currency is
currency of a country which is traded openly in securities markets. Consequently, the
exchange rates for hard currencies are based on supply and demand. This ensures that
a holder of the hard currency will be able to easily trade it for the currency of another
country. Thus, the holder of hard currency faces fewer risks from inflation and devalu-
ation. The currencies of these Eastern European countries cannot be freely traded in
security exchanges and, thus, are not hard currencies.
35. Arbess, Czechoslovakia Opens for Business, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at 33
[hereinafter Arbess].
36. Czech Foreign Exchange Act, supra note 33, at art. 11.
37. BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, at 5-1 n.1. Korunas are the Czechoslova-
kian unit of currency. Id.
38. Czech Foreign Exchange Act, supra note 33, at art. 13. The Act fails to specify
the types of obligations that qualify for the conversion provision, but, most likely,
purchases of component parts and manufacturing equipment would be included. Repa-
triation of profits are covered by the free conversion provision. See infra notes 42-43
and accompanying text (explaining that the CSFR allows repatriation of all profits
under the Foreign Exchange Act).
39. Czech Foreign Exchange Act, supra note 33, at art. 13(2).
40. See Arbess, supra note 35, at 33 (finding that the rate in February 1991 was
about two percent). Investors should be aware of this small additional cost, especially if
their business would require frequent conversions from hard currency to korunas and
back again.
41. Catch-22, supra note 12, at 5. Because the currencies of Eastern European
countries are not fully convertible, the governments can monitor and control all trans-
actions involving the conversion of their currency into a foreign or hard currency
through state-owned banks. See id. (indicating that the currencies of Poland, the
CSFR, and Hungary are not fully convertible). Governments use this control to build
up their own supplies of hard currency in order to pay foreign debts and purchase
foreign products. See id. (explaining that foreign debt and trade deficits deplete the
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FJV maintains in separate foreign currency accounts." Repatriation of
profits qualifies as one of the "foreign currency obligations" under the
terms of the Foreign Exchange Act, permitting investors to convert and
repatriate all profits.4 3 The Foreign Exchange Act requires foreign em-
ployees of FJVs to convert any hard currency holdings in excess of
5,000 korunas. The Foreign Investment Act, however, assures free re-
patriation of after-tax wages, plus the cost of social insurance, if the
employee does not wish to pay for Czechoslovakian social insurance
programs. 45
E. TAX ISSUES
Tax incentives and reduced tax rates encourage investment by pro-
viding a type of subsidy which serves to make foreign investment activ-
ity more profitable., 6 The domestic economy may benefit through in-
creased investment, or may suffer under the cost of subsidizing
marginal investments, depending upon the taxation strategy chosen.4
Critics contend that the Czechoslovakian tax system is both complex
and exorbitant. 8 The annual tax rate for domestic companies starts at
fifty-five percent and can reach ninety percent.49 These rates also apply
to FJVs with less than thirty percent foreign ownership. 0 Taxes on
government's foreign-exchange reserves). Foreigners must convert their currency into
korunas at a government-owned bank, prior to investing in a domestic company. Until
recently, most Eastern European nations made it very difficult for foreign investors to
convert their profits back into dollars in order to bring their profits back to the United
States. Id.
42. Czech Foreign Investment Act, supra note 14, art. 20. The Czech Foreign Ex-
change Act supersedes article 20 of the Czech Foreign Investment Act, which required
that the company's foreign exchange reserve provide the source for repatriation cur-
rency. Id.
43. Czech Foreign Exchange Act, supra note 33, at art. 13, § 1. See State Bank of
Czechoslovakia Announcement No. 15 on Transfers of Income from Non Resident In-
vestments in CSFR, Jan. 3, 1991, §§ 1-4 (demonstrating the Czech Foreign Exchange
Act's impact upon repatriation). Previously, the CSFR permitted FJVs to hold seventy
percent of their foreign currency earnings in separate hard currency accounts. See
Arbess, supra note 35, at 33 (stating that the CSFR required FJVs to exchange thirty
percent of their foreign currency earnings for korunas). FJVs were permitted to use
these funds to repatriate profits or purchase foreign equipment. Id. Now, however, the
FJVs can only maintain foreign currency reserves equal to their initial hard currency
capital contributions. Id.
44. Czech Foreign Exchange Act, supra note 33, at art. 17(1).
45. Czech Foreign Investment Act, supra note 14, at art. 21(l)-(2).
46. B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS 3.6 (1981).
47. Id.
48. BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, at § 5.09.
49. Id.
50. Id. at § 5.09[a]. The CSFR imposed the thirty percent requirement in response
to abuses of the FJV tax incentives. Id. Many domestic companies obtained nominal
1992]
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FJVs with greater than thirty percent foreign ownership are twenty
percent on the first 200,000 korunas and forty percent thereafter."
Both foreign and domestic investors are subject to a tax of fifty percent
on net surplus after liquidation. 2 A foreign investor's distributed earn-
ings are subject to a twenty-five percent withholding tax5 3 which ap-
plies whether or not the investor repatriates the income. 4
foreign investment in order to qualify for the reduced rates applicable to FJVs, thus
depriving the government of tax revenues while not proportionately increasing foreign
investment in the CSFR. Id. at § 5.09.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at § 5.09(d). The CSFR has not entered into a tax treaty with the United
States, although one is sought. Id. Consequently, American investors are subject to
double taxation on distributed profits. See Roin, The Grand Illusion: A Neutral Sys-
tem for the Taxation of International Transactions, 75 VA. L. REv. 919, 923 (1989)
[hereinafter Roin] (outlining a neutral system for taxation of international transac-
tions). The United States reserves the right to tax its resident and nonresident citizens
on income earned in any foreign country. Id. Similarly, the CSFR has the right to tax
profits earned by foreigners within the CSFR. Id. Double taxation has a stifling effect
on international investment. Id. at 924. International investment would be less attrac-
tive than a similar domestic investment if both countries were to tax the same amount
of income. Id. Under bilateral tax treaties, nations agree to reduce their respective tax
rates on international income in order to ensure that the total tax bill to the individual
is representative of the normal tax bills for domestic earnings. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Model Double Taxation Convention on In-
come and Capital, [I Tax Treaties] Fed. Taxes (P-H) 1 1017 (1977). Typically, this
limits a host country's tax rate to five or fifteen percent of the income earned inside
that country. Id. at art. 10, 1 2(a)(b). The nation of citizenship is free to tax income,
but must deduct the taxes paid to the foreign nation. Id. at art. 11(2). Thus, the inves-
tor incurs the same tax liability that he would have in a domestic investment. Id.
The United States recognizes the benefits of encouraging residents to earn income
abroad, namely increased income from overseas investments and increased employment
through the sale of American goods abroad. Roin, 75 VA. L. REV. at 920. Though the
United States should encourage overseas investment, there are drawbacks resulting
from the expatriation of capital that accompany overseas investment. Id. at 920-21.
When investors build factories in other nations, existing American factories lose access
to capital and must contend with increased foreign competition. Id. This can cata-
strophically affect American industry and jobs. Id. The United States believes it should
encourage American investors to make all investment decisions based on the underlying
merits of each opportunity, rather than in anticipation of government subsidies. Id.
This strategy allows investors to take advantage of truly profitable opportunities, and
avoids the subsidization of otherwise unattractive investments in foreign ventures that
compete with American companies and workers. Id. Such an objective is accomplished
by a system of tax neutrality. Id. at 922. Tax neutrality seeks to equalize tax liabilities
associated with foreign and domestic earnings. Id. The United States grants investors a
tax credit for every dollar paid in taxes to foreign governments on income derived from
foreign investment, up to the amount that the United States would tax on the same
earnings. Id.
54. BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, at § 5.09(d).
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F. PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
The CSFR has taken a bifurcated approach to the privatization of its
125,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 5 enacting two separate laws
which segregate SOEs into "large" and "small" enterprises. 6 These
laws provide very different mechanisms and procedures for the trans-
formation of large and small companies.57
Under the terms of the Large Privatization Law, each company has
the authority to initiate and develop its own privatization plan.58 The
plan must include a proposed schedule, specify all assets to be priva-
tized59 and describe how the state acquired the assets. 0 The company
must submit the plan listing all interested investors 1 to the State Prop-
erty Agency (SPA).62
55. See Glick & Richter, Legal Framework for Privatization in Czechoslovakia,
19 INT'L Bus. LAW. 353, 353 (1991) [hereinafter Glick & Richter] (detailing the insti-
tutional, administrative, and legal aspects of the Czechoslovakian privatization
process).
56. Compare Act on the Conditions of Transfer of State Property to Other Persons,
(Feb. 26, 1991), reprinted in Central & Eastern European Legal Texts (1991), as
translated by the United States Dept. of Commerce, [hereinafter Czech Large Priva-
tization Law] (leaving the identification of large companies to the government) with
Law on Transfers of State Property with regard to Some Objects to Other Legal or
Physical Persons, (Feb. 18, 1991), as translated by the United States Dept. of Com-
merce, reprinted in Central and Eastern European Legal Texts (1990) [hereinafter
Czech Small Privatization Law].
57. Id.
58. See Czech Large Privatization Law, supra note 56, at art. 7, § 2 (contending
that the state-owned enterprise should initiate most privatizations). In addition, article
7 permits the "founder" or the "person different from enterprise" to develop a plan, as
long as he consults with the "enterprise." Id. The term "founder" refers to the re-
cently-established State Property Agency, which acts as an impartial, business-oriented
intermediary between the government and the SOEs. BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note
11, at § 5.02(b). The initiation of privatizations by "persons different from enterprise"
appears to permit the hostile takeover of SOEs. See Czech Large Privatization Law,
supra note 56, at art. 7, § 2 (discussing privatization).
59. Czech Large Privatization Law, supra note 56, at art. 6, § 1(a). See id. at art.
6(c) (requiring the specification of all nonperforming or useless assets).
60. See id. at art. 6, § 1(b) (requiring data regarding the state's acquisition of
private property). This information is essential to the CSFR's comprehensive restitu-
tion program, which will return property confiscated by the government after February
25, 1948, to its former owners. Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation (Feb. 22, 1991).
reprinted in National Technical Information Services of The United States Department
of Commerce (1991) [hereinafter Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation]. The privatiza-
tion plan must fully describe a method for settling all restitution claims. Czech Large
Privatization Law, supra note 56, at art. 6, § 1.
61. See generally, Czech Large Privatization Law, supra note 56. Although, the
term "interested investors" is not defined, this phrase appears intended to discourage
managers from negotiating self-serving deals in the privatization process. Id.
62. See Czech Large Privatization Law, supra note 56, at art. 8, § I (discussing
State Property Agency). The term "founder" was left without a precise definition in
anticipation of legislation establishing a State Property Agency to act as an indepen-
1992]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The SPA evaluates the plan, makes recommendations, and submits
the plan to the Federal Ministry of Finance, 3 or the appropriate re-
public agency, for approval and implementation of the privatization .
If the plan provides for the sale of the company without a public auc-
tion or competitive bidding, it is forwarded to the federal or republic
government for final approval. 5 When final approval is granted, the
government terminates66 the SOE and transfers the designated assets
to a state-owned holding "fund. 67 Three funds retain these assets on
behalf of the federal and the republican governments.68 Citizens may
purchase shares of the funds through the use of vouchers, pursuant to
the terms of the firm's privatization plan pertaining to the issuance of
vouchers.6 "
dent intermediary between the federal government and the SOE in the privatization
process. Id. The term "founder" also refers to the equivalent agencies in the respective
republics for privatizations under republic authority. Id.
63. Id. at art. 8, § l(a).
64. Id. at art. 10, § 1. The law provides no basis from which to determine whether
the federal or republic SPA has jurisdiction over a particular privatization. Id. Article
42, however, requires the division of the proceeds from the liquidation of a company's
assets or from the sale of the company between the respective governments on a prede-
termined basis. Id. at art. 42, § 2. This division of proceeds demonstrates the deference
shown to the republic governments by the federal government. See id. at art. 10 §§ (a),
(b) (granting the appropriate republic authority the power of approval if the federal
government lacks jurisdiction). Thus, if a jurisdictional question were to arise, the SPA
of each government would most likely become involved. Id.
65. Id. at art. 10, § 3. While the SPA is a government agency, it acts as an inde-
pendent intermediary. BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, § 5.02(b)(3), at 5-17. This
independent status allows for objectivity and, thus, serves to prevent delays by en-
trenched bureaucrats, and allows decisions to be made on the basis of sound business
judgment, rather than on political considerations.
66. Czech Large Privatization Law, supra note 56, at art. 11, § 1. The "termina-
tion" of a company refers to its cessation of status as a separate entity.
67. Id. at art. 11, §§ 1, 2. These government-owned funds are a hybrid of a regula-
tory agency, an investment bank, and a municipal fund. Id. In some cases they simply
oversee the process, in other cases they take control of shares or of the company itself.
Id. at arts. 11-42.
68. Id. at art. 11.
69. See generally Glick & Richter, supra note 55, at 353 (describing the voucher
system). Drafts of the Czech Large Privatization Law originally contemplated that all
eligible citizens would receive the right to purchase vouchers for a nominal fee. Id. The
vouchers allowed eligible citizens to purchase shares of the privatized companies. Id.
This concept provided for the availability of forty to sixty percent of the shares of
privatized companies through the use of these vouchers. Id. The state would apportion
another twenty to thirty percent of the shares among individuals seeking to settle resti-
tution claims of former owners. Id. The state would retain ten percent of the shares. Id.
Due to the failure to reach a consensus on the specifics of the voucher system, the Act




The federal and republic funds may sell the privatized property by
contract or through public auctions. 0 Upon acceptance of the high bid,
purchasers obtain ownership of the assets as well as all rights or obliga-
tions specified in the privatization plan.71 A contract between the com-
pany and purchaser provides the only means by which to transfer intel-
lectual property rights.72
While the Czechoslovakian government has announced its intent to
privatize fifty large firms under the formal structure of the Large
Privatization Law 73 it is likely that the CSFR will continue to pursue
additional privatizations through direct negotiations on an ad hoc
basis.74
G. PRIVATIZATION OF SMALL FIRMS
The second prong of the CSFR's privatization program is the Small
Privatization Law (SPL) 5 which provides the framework for the
privatization of 120,000 of the CSFR's 125,000 SOEs. Unlike the
large privatization program, the SPL will not require small state-owned
companies to undergo transformation before private owners take con-
trol; the government will not retain ownership in the privatized compa-
nies, nor issue vouchers to citizens.77
While the Large Privatization Law invites foreign investors to par-
ticipate in the privatization and purchase of SOEs, the Small Privatiza-
70. See Czech Large Privatization Law, supra note 56, at art. 14, § I (discussing
how the funds accomplish the sale of private property).
71. Id. at art. 15, § 1.
72. Id. at art. 6. The purchase of company shares does not provide a shareholder
with the right to personal use of intellectual property. Id. The development and protec-
tion of intellectual property law in Eastern Europe is vital to the attainment of ad-
vanced technologies.
73. Frankel, Czechs Head West to Pitch Privatization of Industries Officials Go
to London in Search of Investors, Wash. Post, June 14, 1991, at A23. This first wave
of large privatizations is intended to raise S1.5 billion in 1991, and another S3 billion in
1992. Id. The following industries are among those targeted for privatization: chemical,
construction equipment, paper, textile, electronics, and metals processing. Id.
74. See Glick & Richter, supra note 55, at 354 (noting ongoing individually-nego-
tiated sales during and after the enactment of this law).
75. See Law on Transfers of State Property with Regard to Some Objects to Other
Legal or Physical Persons (Oct. 25, 1990), reprinted in BusINEsS VENTURES, supra
note 11, app. c-5 [hereinafter 1990 Czech Small Privatization Law] (discussing the
Czechoslovakian law relating to the privatization process for small companies). The
law does not explain how to determine what law applies to a given company. Id. The
government of the respective republic designates the small companies and initiates the
privatization process. Id. at art. 4, § 3.
76. Glick & Richter, supra note 55, at 353.
77. See 1990 Czech Small Privatization Law, supra note 75, arts. 4-12 (providing
for the privatization of small companies by direct sale to investors at government held
public auctions).
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tion Law precludes foreign investors from any involvement in the initial
purchase of small SOEs, unless no Czechoslovakian citizen is willing to
pay an adequate price. 8 Under the SPL, the republics must publicly
announce the sale of small firms at least thirty days in advance.70 The
sale must take place at an impartial public auction.80 During the first
auction of a small SOE, only Czechoslovakian citizens may bid." If no
Czechoslovakians purchase the SOE, it is auctioned a second time and
open for bid from all interested buyers.82
In order to bid on a company, a prospective buyer must deposit the
higher of 10,000 korunas8s or ten percent of the opening price.84 Losing
bidders are refunded all but 1,000 korunas, which constitutes the bid-
ding fee.8 5 The winning bidder is deemed to take possession and control
of the assets once the bid is accepted, 86 and is guaranteed continuation
of existing leases for at least two years after purchase.87 A Czechoslo-
vakian who purchases a small SOE is not permitted to sell it to a for-
eign investor within two years of the sale. 88 Foreign investors are enti-
tled to purchase the SOE after the expiration of the two year period, or
if the firm was sold to a Czechoslovakian in its second appearance at
78. 1990 Czech Small Privatization Law, supra note 75, at art. 13, §§ 1-3.
79. Id. at art. 4, § 6.
80. Id. at art. 6. But see art. 16 (granting the right of first refusal to persons who
have operated existing small SOEs since October 1, 1990). The right of first refusal
allows operators of existing state-owned companies to circumvent the bidding process
and purchase their shops for the opening bid price, which is set at the estimated value
of the company's assets. Id. at arts. 8, 16. Thus, if a company's true market value is
higher than that of its assets due to its high earnings potential, operators who purchase
for asset value will receive a windfall.
81. See id. at art. 3 (stating that only Czech or Slovak citizens, or persons who
became Czech citizens after February 25, 1948, may own small companies).
82. See id. at art. 3 (precluding foreigners from gaining control of the small com-
panies). See also id. at art. 13 (permitting foreigners to purchase a small company if
no Czechoslovakians are willing to pay the value of the firm's assets at the initial
auction).
83. 1990 Czech Small Privatization Law, supra note 75, at art. 5, § 1. This amount
is equivalent to approximately $330 at current exchange rates. See Czechoslovakia -
Country Marketing Plan, in National Trade Data Bank Market Reports, ch. II(a)(4)
(describing Czechoslovakia's monetary policy, and providing the current exchange
rate).
84. 1990 Czech Small Privatization Law, supra note 75, at art. 5. An evaluation of
the assets of the small SOE determines the starting bid price. Id. at art. 8.
85. Id. at art. 5.
86. Id. at art. 12, § 1.
87. Id. at art. 15. Conflicting claims of the ownership of property confiscated by the
communist government has made both leases and property sales extremely difficult and
risky to negotiate. Glick & Richter, supra note 55, at 355. The Czechoslovakian gov-
ernment hopes to establish clear title to all property within two years through its resti-
tution program. Id. See Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation, supra note 60 (describing
the restitution program).
88. 1990 Czech Small Privatization Law, supra note 75, at art. 17, § 1.
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auction.89 Money generated by the sale of these companies is deposited
into accounts used to settle restitution claims of former owners of firms
nationalized after 1948.90
The first auction of small SOEs took place in January 1991. Most
considered the auction a success, as the small SOEs sold for ten times
their starting bid price.91 As the best shops are sold off, however, and
available capital is consumed, sales of less-desirable assets may prove
less profitable."2
The CSFR's implementation of this privatization and foreign invest-
ment regime has been slow.9 3 Despite the privatization of more than
6,000 small shops, less than two percent of the GNP is produced by
privately-owned businesses.94 Furthermore, large firm privatization is
not scheduled to begin until 1992.1" The lack of an operating stock
market is likely to discourage investments by many foreigners who pre-
fer shorter-term investments.9 "
II. HUNGARY
Due to its long experience with a mixture of communism and capi-
talism,97 Hungary was a step ahead of its neighbors when reforms
swept Eastern Europe in 1989.98 While its reformist legislation paral-
lels that of Poland and the CSFR, Hungary possesses more of the busi-
89. Id.
90. Id. at art. 20, § 1-2.
91. See Glick & Richter, supra note 55, at 354 (asserting that Czechoslovakian
officials did not expect the demand for small SOEs to exceed supply).
92. See id. (predicting that bids for small SOEs will decrease as capital for acquisi-
tions is depleted).
93. See Catch-22, supra note 12, at 9 (anticipating a slow transformation to a free
market).
94. See id. (stating that trade barriers remain in the form of high tariffs on imports
that compete with Czech goods).
95. See Glick & Richter, supra note 55, at 354 (predicting the sale of large SOEs
in 1991).
96. See Catch-22, supra note 12, at 9 (noting that the CSFR has not agreed to a
stock market plan).
97. See BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, at § 3.01 (observing that Hungary's
blend of capitalism and communism became widely known as "Goulash communism").
Hungary has experimented with market-driven economic reforms since the late 1960s.
See id. (concluding that Hungary intended to make a gradual move to a free market
economy). Other reforms introduced in Hungary prior to 1989 include: the market
pricing of goods; the elimination of central planning in many sectors of the economy;
and the introduction of a system for autonomous self-management in state-owned com-
panies. See id. (asserting that Hungary utilized diverse and extensive techniques to
reform markets).
98. See Catch-22, supra note 12, at 9 (indicating that Hungary had always led the
Soviet bloc in reformation efforts under communism).
19921
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ness framework necessary to support a market economy.9 9 As a result,
Hungary has attracted more direct foreign investment than either Po-
land or the CSFR.100
A. PERMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING A FJV
Hungary's FJV approval requirements are the most liberal in East-
ern Europe.' The 1990 amendment to the Hungarian Investment Act
of 1988102 eliminated the need to obtain governmental approval to es-
tablish a FJV, 103 even when the JV is one hundred percent foreign
owned.' 0 ' The FJV must meet standard incorporation requirements,105
however, and must register with the Court of Firms within thirty days
of adoption of its articles of incorporation. 0 6 Promoters are also subject
99. See id. at 9 (declaring that Hungary's longstanding leading position in eco-
nomic reform is evinced by its well-established stock market and the fact that the pri-
vate sector already generates one-third of GNP). Hungary began to decentralize the
economic decision-making process in the early 1980s. As a result, Hungary has a small
corps of managers with exposure to profit and efficiency considerations in the produc-
tion and investment decision-making process. Owners Are The Only Answer, 10 in A
Survey of Business In Eastern Europe, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, at 64.
100. Catch-22, supra note 12, at 9. Hungary has attracted more than $1 billion in
investment to date. Id.
101. See BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, at § 3.04 (providing an overview of
Hungary's foreign investment regime, and concluding that, while concerns remain,
Hungary's foreign investment climate is the most liberal in Eastern Europe). Compare
Unified Text of Act XXIV of 1988 Regarding Investments by Non-Residents in Hun-
gary With Subsequent Amendments and Supplements, reprinted in Newsletter Hun-
gary, No. 1/1991 [hereinafter Hungarian Investment Act] (setting forth the Hun-
garian investment requirements) with Czech Foreign Investment Act, supra note 14, at
arts. 5 & 6 (describing the CSFR's Foreign Investment Law, which simplified the pro-
cess for obtaining permits for all FJVs) and New Polish Investment Law, infra note
175 (indicating that Polish law still requires permits for certain sectors).
102. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101.
103. R. JOHNSON, INVESTMENT GUIDE TO HUNGARY 12-13 (1991) [hereinafter
JOHNSON]. Prior to the amendment, any company with majority foreign ownership was
required to obtain a joint license from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
International Economic Relations. Id. The amendment does not require approval prior
to the establishment of a company with foreign ownership. Id.
104. See Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101, at § 3 (mandating the estab-
lishment of FJVs in accordance with the organizational provisions of Act VI of 1988 on
Economic Associations). This Act applies to both domestic and foreign corporations in
Hungary. Id.
105. Act VI of 1988 on Economic Associations, reprinted in THE HUNGARY HAND-
BOOK §§ 19-27 (Vencor Publishing Co. 1990) [hereinafter Company Act].
106. Id. at § 23(1). There is a registration fee equal to two percent of the FJV's
capital, with a minimum charge of five thousand forints and a maximum charge of six
thousand forints. See JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 13 (noting that there is also a ten
thousand forint fee for listing the company in the official register).
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to unlimited personal liability for any activities commenced prior to
registration."0 7
B. PROTECTION AGAINST EXPROPRIATION OF INVESTMENTS
The Hungarian Investment Act provides "complete protection and
security" for foreign investors in Hungary. 08 The Act requires full and
immediate repayment of losses resulting from nationalization, expropri-
ation, or any measure having similar consequences. 09 In addition to the
protections contained in the Unified Foreign Investment Act, the bilat-
eral investment treaty between Hungary and the United States protects
American investors against impairment of contractual rights and other
interests."10 Investors should also note that Hungary has not expropri-
ated any foreign assets since 1953; and, in 1973, Hungary settled all
debts for American assets expropriated when communist rule began.""
C. REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE SOURCES OF FOREIGN CAPITAL
FOR INVESTMENT
The Hungarian Investment Act requires that a foreign investor's
cash contributions to the capital of an FJV be in the form of hard
currency,"" unless the investor uses forints" 3 obtained from an invest-
ment in another Hungarian FJV.1"4 Foreign investors are permitted to
make non-cash contributions, consisting of any tangible asset or intel-
lectual property, toward the capital of an FJV."5 Regardless of the
sources of funds, foreign investors may only acquire registered shares in
an FJV.11"
107. Company Act, supra note 105, at § 25(1). Thus, although the laws with re-
spect to obtaining a permit and registering a foreign-owned company are liberal, adher-
ence to the minimal requirements is essential in an effort to prevent liability.
108. Hungarian Investment Act supra note 101, at § l(1). But see BusINEss VEN-
TURES, supra note 11, at § 3.06(a) (suggesting that the provisions of the Hungarian
law fail to provide adequate protection for foreign investment, and opining that the
exercise of judicial power by the now independent Hungarian courts will serve to rem-
edy this situation).
109. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101, at § 1(2)-(4).
110. Agreement on Trade Relations, Mar. 17, 1978, United States-Hungary, 29
U.S.T. 2711, T.I.A.S. No. 8967.
111. See JoHNSON, supra note 103, at 10 (noting Hungary's exemplary expropria-
tions record).
112. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101, at § 12(l).
113. JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 1. The forint is Hungary's form of currency. Id.
One United States dollar equals approximately seventy-six forints. Id.
114. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101, at § 12(1). These funds include
dividends or proceeds from the sale or liquidation of another FJV. Id.
115. Id. at § 12(2).
116. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101, at § 13(2).
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D. CONVERTIBILITY OF CURRENCY
Hungary plans to make the forint fully convertible within three
years.1 7 Until then, the Hungarian government will continue to control
the conversion of currency. Hard currency contributions to capital may
be maintained in a separate foreign currency account and may be used
freely to import production equipment and durable goods," 8 and for
hard currency expenses. 1 9 The conversion of hard currency earnings
into forints 2 ° is at the rate set by the National Bank of Hungary pur-
suant to the Hungarian Investment Act.''
E. REPATRIATION OF EARNINGS
The Hungarian Investment Act permits repatriation of a foreign in-
vestor's share of profits and of proceeds from the liquidation of an
FJV.' 2' A foreign investor, however, may not repatriate proceeds from
the sale of an investment in an FJV, unless the investment is sold to the
FJV itself.2 3 Finally, foreign employees of FJVs may only repatriate a
maximum of fifty percent of their wages. 2 "
117. JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 23.
118. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101, at § 31(3). The freedom to im-
port also applies to purchases made with forint earnings. JOHNSON, supra note 103, at
19. In most cases, the company is free to convert forints into hard currency at its
Hungarian bank, and then import the products. Id. If the company intends to import
energy, fuel, agricultural products, metals, or minerals, however, it must obtain a li-
cense from the Ministry of International Economic Relations in order to convert forints
into hard currency. Id.
119. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101, at § 31(3).
120. JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 24.
121. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101 at § 31(2). This official rate typi-
cally overvalues the forint by three to fifteen percent. JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 24.
Consequently, the conversion process presents a significant cost to companies. Id. Fur-
thermore, a company that opts to retain earnings in forints exposes itself to the risk
that the Hungarian government will devalue its currency in response to high inflation.
Id. Over the past three years, Hungary has devalued its currency by more than thirty
percent. Id. Investors may choose to take advantage of hedging devices that can elimi-
nate the risk of loss from such adjustments; but these entail some cost. Id.
122. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101, at § 32(1). The amount of repa-
triated profits is not limited to the amount of foreign currency the firm has retained.
JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 23. The company is free to convert forints into hard
currency in order to repatriate the foreign investor's share of distributed profits. Id.
The company must file a financial statement with the Court of Firms, then submit a
request to a Hungarian bank, which assesses a processing fee of approximately four
percent before repatriation. Id.
123. JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 28.




FJVs in Hungary are subject to two major taxes: the general turno-
ver tax'2 5 and the business profit tax. 126 The general turnover tax is
essentially a sales tax, which applies three different rates to sales trans-
actions, depending upon the importance of the FJV's industry.
Food, energy, and basic services are exempt from the turnover tax.127
Important services are taxed at a rate of fifteen percent, while the ma-
jority of goods and services are taxed at the rate of twenty-five per-
cent.1 28 The general turnover tax, moreover, does not apply to the
purchase of operating equipment or investments. 1 2
The business profit tax of forty percent applies to all business in
Hungary including FJVs. °30 An amendment to the FJV law eliminated
a reduction of twenty percent for FJVs with foreign capital contribu-
tions of at least five million forints or twenty percent foreign equity
ownership.' The amended law, however, retains tax incentives for
FJVs that construct and operate hotels or engage in manufacturing,
provided that the FJVs have registered capital in excess of fifty million
forints, and that foreign ownership is at least thirty percent.3 2 In these
cases, FJVs receive tax concessions of sixty percent during the first five
years and concessions of forty percent for the next five years.' 3 3 More-
over, if the FJV participates in particularly important activities, these
concessions are one hundred percent for the first five years and sixty
percent for the next five years.' If an investor or the FJV reinvests
125. Law No. XL of 1989 on the General Turnover-Tax, reprinted in Nat'l Tech.
Info. Services, Cent. & E. Eur. Legal Texts (Dec. 31, 1989) [hereinafter Turnover Tax
Law].
126. Entrepreneurial Profit Tax Law IX of 1988 in Unified Structure with Law
XLIV of 1989, reprinted in BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note I1, app. H-10.
127. JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 24-25.
128. Id.
129. Turnover Tax Law, supra note 125, at § 17. Imported capital equipment may
enter Hungary dutyfree; however, if the FJV sells or leases the equipment within three
years of its importation, the full duty becomes due. Hungarian Investment Act, supra
note 101, at § 31(3).
130. JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 25.
131. Id. The perception that the incentives were ineffective and that domestic com-
panies were obtaining nominal foreign investment to take advantage of the tax breaks
may explain the elimination of this deduction.
132. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101, at § 15(2)(a). This ensures sub-
stantial foreign investment before tax benefits are claimed.
133. Id.
134. Id. at § 15(2)(b). Such activities include:
(1) Electronics;
(2) Manufacture of component parts for vehicles;
(3) Production of machine tools;
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profits or proceeds from liquidations in Hungary, the reinvested profits
are exempt from the profits tax.13 5
G. FREE TRADE ZONES
The Hungarian Investment Act provides for the establishment of
FJVs in Free Trade Zones in an attempt to encourage FJVs that man-
ufacture exports.' FJVs located in government-designated free trade
zones are treated as if located in foreign countries for purposes of cus-
toms, currency exchange, excise taxes, and foreign trade.'3 7 This treat-
ment is not available to trading companies. 138 FJVs operating in these
zones are permitted the right to maintain foreign currency accounts in
Hungary and abroad.' 9 The Hungarian government requires that in-
vestors maintain funds used to pay wages, rent, taxes, and other operat-
ing expenses in forint accounts. 40 The firm's initial capitalization must
be held in domestic banks. 4'
H. PRIVATIZATION
Hungary's privatization program is based on its Amended Transfor-
mation Law, 4 2 which, unlike the Czechoslovakian law, applies to the
(4) Manufacture of agricultural, food processing and forestry machines and
equipment;
(5) Production from machine parts and components;
(6) Production based on packing technology;
(7) Production of pharmaceutical products, plant protecting agents and interme-
diary products;
(8) Development of the Hungarian protein basis;
(9) Food production;
(10) Undertaking activities 1-9 in industrial commission work;
(11) Production of propagating and breeding material;
(12) Agricultural production;
(13) Tourism; and
(14) Public telecommunication services.
Law No. XLIV of 1989 Enclosure No. 5 (effective Jan. 1, 1990) (amending Hungarian
Investment Act § 15(2)(c) supra note 101), reprinted in Newsletter Hungary 1/1991
at 8-11.
135. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101, at § 16(1).
136. Id. at § 37. These zones are established by the government. Id. at § 40. Inves-
tors who wish to take advantage of the duty free zones must submit an application
verifying that the land on which the company will operate has been declared a customs
free zone. Id. at § 40.
137. Id. at § 38.
138. Id. at § 37(1).
139. Id. at § 41(4)(a).
140. Id. at § 42(2).
141. Id. at § 41(4)(a).
142. Act XIII of 1989 on the Conversion of Economic Organizations and Business
Associations, as amended by LXXII of 1990 [hereinafter Hungarian Transformation
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privatization of large and small enterprises in equal measure." 3 The
law permits three methods for initiating privatization: (1) spontaneous
privatization;"14 (2) government-initiated privatization;"45 and (3) in-
vestor-initiated privatization. 4 6 In order for a company to initiate the
privatization process, the director of the SOE must secure the support
of a two-thirds majority of the company council which consists of em-
ployees.1 47 The director of the SOE must then notify the State Property
Management Organization (SPA).14 8 The notification must contain:
(1) an indication of the economic objectives of the transformed com-
pany; (2) a statement of the estimated registered capital of the new
company; (3) a preliminary feasibility study; (4) a description of the
transformed company's potential prospects for exports, investment, em-
ployment, and markets; (5) a list of possible outside investors; (6) the
book value of the existing assets of the SOE; and (7) a copy of the
current balance sheet.1 49
While the SPA is reviewing the notification, the enterprise may not
enter into any binding legal commitments. 150 Upon the SPA's approval
Law]. Unlike the CSFR's privatization laws, the Hungarian Transformation Law does
not address the issue of restitution for confiscated property. JOHNSON, supra note 103,
at 15. While proposed restitution legislation would provide a mechanism for compen-
sating former owners, at the moment there is significant ambiguity as to the ownership
of assets controlled by SOEs, thus making the privatization process risky. Id.
143. See Hungarian Transformation Law, supra note 142, at T 2 (listing the types
of enterprises encompassed by the Act). Compare with Czech Large Privatization Law,
supra note 56, and accompanying text (discussing the CSFR's very different proce-
dures for privatizing large and small companies); Czech Small Privatization Law,
supra note 56, and accompanying text.
144. See JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 4 (describing the privatization options avail-
able to investors). In a spontaneous privatization, the managers and employees of the
enterprise initiate and conduct the privatization independent of governmental oversight.
Id. Once the parties agree to the sale, however, they must obtain SPA permission to
complete the transaction. Id.
145. See Hungarian Transformation Law, supra note 142, at 16 (discussing the
transformation of state-owned enterprises under government supervision). The govern-
ment identifies candidates for privatization and oversees the process. JOHNSON, supra
note 103, at 4.
146. See BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, at § 3.02(a) (explaining that inves-
tor-initiated privatization affords foreign investors a wider choice of investment oppor-
tunities). Foreign investors often negotiate with the government in spite of the SOEs
disapproval. Id. Potential investors can bid on a company not included in the SPAs
privatization plans without prior negotiation with the company's managers. Id.
147. Hungarian Transformation Law, supra note 142, at 17(1).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 17(2).
150. Id. at 1 17(3). This is a byproduct of the skepticism surrounding the "sponta-
neous privatizations" that took place prior to the law's enactment. See Privatization in
Eastern Europe, THE ECONoOMIST, Nov. 17, 1990, at 88 (describing public reaction in
Hungary to the surge of spontaneous privatizations). There was wide-spread perception
among many Hungarians that self-serving or incompetent managers were privatizing
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of the transformation, the director and council of the SOE must then
formulate a transformation plan that is consistent with the notification
it sent to the SPA, and incorporate any conditions set forth by the
SPA. 1 5 The plan must also contain an estimate of the market value of
the SOE.152 If the SPA approves the transformation plan, it will pub-
lish an announcement containing all information pertinent to
privatization.'"
Upon transformation, the privatized company becomes the legal suc-
cessor to the old SOE.1 4 Thus, the transformed company retains all
rights to utilize all patents,8 5 licenses, and permits obtained prior to
transformation.1 6 The SPA, however, takes ownership of all shares of
the transformed company, unless outside investors have purchased an
interest in the company.1 57 The SPA then distributes a predetermined
number of shares of the company, free of charge, to local governments
having jurisdiction over real estate owned by the company. 15 8 The SPA
sells the remaining stock, delivering at least twenty percent of the pro-
and selling their companies to foreign investors at prices far below market value. Id.
This was largely due to the ad hoc nature of these privatizations, the lack of govern-
ment involvement in any aspect of the negotiations, and the companies' failure to pub-
licly solicit competitive bids. JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 4. Public mistrust of the
process led to the Hungarian Supreme Court's nullification of the sale of Hungar Ho-
tels to foreign investors on grounds that the bidding process was improper and the sale
price was unacceptably low. Id.
151. Hungarian Transformation Law, supra note 142, at I 17B(1)-(2). The plan
must also specify the type of business association the SOE has chosen to adopt and
include a draft of the articles of the new association. Id. at I 6(c).
152. See id. at 17B(2) (noting that the state-owned enterprise must provide the
SPA with the fair market value of business assets and property).
153. Id. at V 7. SOE creditors must receive direct notification of the imminent
transformation and are entitled to demand security for their outstanding claims. Id. at
1 9(2). Creditors can opt to take shares of the transformed company in satisfaction of
the existing debt. Id. at 1 9(l).
154. Id. at $ 8(1).
155. See BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, at § 3.09 (stating that joint ventures
that include foreign investments are protected by Hungarian law). Hungary is a mem-
ber of several international intellectual property conventions, and has various laws
designed to protect intellectual property. Id. Foreign companies, however, have exper-
ienced insufficient protection of pharmaceutical and chemical patents. JOHNSON, supra
note 103, at 16. In some cases, Hungarian firms have copied foreign patented products
and sold them in other nations. Id.
156. Hungarian Transformation Law, supra note 142, at I 8(1). The transformed
company must immediately notify all appropriate licensing agencies in order to pre-
serve these benefits. Id.
157. Id. at T 22(1).
158. Id. at T 21(2). The share value provided to the local governments must equal
the market value of the property within the local government's jurisdiction. Id.
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ceeds to the company,159 while retaining up to eighty percent of the
proceeds.160
Pursuant to provisions of the Transformation Law, the Hungarian
government enacted the SPA Law, 161 creating the State Property
Agency and providing a framework and mechanisms for the privatiza-
tion of Hungarian SOEs. 162 This law empowered the SPA to act as the
intermediary between the government and the transformed compa-
nies. 1 3 Spontaneous privatizations, which had been the primary vehicle
for privatization, had incited public suspicion and charges of corrup-
tion.'" Thus, the SPA was created in an effort to bring objectivity to
the decision-making process.165 This independently-chartered agency
interacts with firms throughout the privatization process. Once it ap-
proves the privatization plan, the SPA invites competitive applications,
through local advertising, for the purchase of the company's stock or
assets. 6 The SPA then reviews and evaluates the merits of the bids'6"
and negotiates appropriate contracts with the winning bidders." 8 Both
foreign and domestic parties are permitted to bid on the transformed
properties.16 9
Hungarian reform efforts have led to problems similar to those ex-
perienced in Poland and the CSFR.1 70 Such problems include lower-
159. See Company Act, supra note 105, at § 244 (detailing guidelines for "work-
ers" shares). These funds increase the registered capital of the company, for which the
company may issue an additional amount of stock to its employees free of charge, or at
a reduced rate. Id.
160. Hungarian Transformation Law, supra note 142, at T 21(1)-(2).
161. Law No. VII of 1990 on Foundation of State Property Agency with the Pur-
pose of the Management and Utilization of Property Pertaining to This (Jan. 26,
1990), reprinted in BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, app. H-3 [hereinafter SPA
Law].
162. Id. at 15.
163. See Hungary Handbook, Aug., 1990, at 4 (noting that the SPA was formed to
oversee privatizations, and to consider the immediate and long-term interests of the
parties).
164. See supra note 150 (describing public perception to the privatization process).
165. Id.
166. SPA Law, supra note 161, at § 22(1). Competitive bidding is open to all,
unless the SPA decides to limit the bidding pool. Paradoxically, interested parties may
submit bids regardless of the desired pool size. Id.
167. See id. at § 22(3)-(4) (explaining that experts assess the value of the business
and the SPA board of directors then evaluates the bids accordingly).
168. See id. at § 23(1) (noting that foreign applicants chosen to contract with the
SPA must form an economic association under Hungarian law in order to validate the
contract).
169. Id. at § 25(2). Compare with 1990 Czech Small Privatization Law, supra
note 75, at arts. 3 & 13(2) (granting bidding rights to Czechoslovakian nationals, but
limiting foreigners to bidding on properties rejected by Czechoslovakians).
170. See Catch-22, supra note 12, at 9 (summarizing the progress of the switch to
market economies in Eastern European nations).
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than-expected levels of foreign investment, and slow progress toward
privatization.
III. POLAND
Poland was the first Eastern European nation to begin the conversion
to a democratic society.'7 1 Full implementation of desired reforms,
however, was delayed by the extended time frame provided for the
communists to relinquish power.17 2 Reformers in nations that ousted
socialist governments after Poland, were able to obtain control more
quickly, and thus, enact more progressive legislation earlier.173
On June 14, 1991, the Polish Sejm, the lower house of the Polish
Parliament, passed a new foreign investment law,10 considered by legal
scholars to be the most liberal foreign investment law in Eastern Eu-
rope. 76 While it repeals the old law,17 7 the new law specifies that per-
mits for FJVs issued under the old law remain valid, and that condi-
tions contained in the old permits must still be observed." 8
This comprehensive foreign investment legislation remedies inade-
quacies of prior law that had discouraged foreign investment. 7 9 Al-
though communist law permitted the formation of FJVs, it imposed
burdensome requirements and empowered government with a great
deal of discretionary control. 180 Newly enacted laws eliminate most of
these impediments to foreign investment.181




174. J. F. BROWN, SURGE TO FREEDOM 335 (1991).
175. Law of the 14th of June, 1991 on Companies With Foreign Participation
(1991) [hereinafter New Polish Investment Law].
176. Poland, International Reports, Jan. 25, 1991.
177. New Polish Investment Law, supra note 175, at art. 43, § 1 (repealing Law on
Economic Activity with the Participation of Foreign Parties (Dec. 23, 1988)).
178. New Polish Investment Law, supra note 175, at arts. 19, § 1, 43, § 3.
179. Tokarczyk & Webb, The New Polish Foreign Investment Law, 5 LAW &
Bus. INSIGHTS 9, 30 (Sept. 1991).
180. See Domanski, New Foreign Investment Legislation, Polish News Bulletin,
July 12, 1991 (describing some of the impediments contained in the old law and assess-
ing the benefits of the new law).
181. See id. (describing the legislative changes that facilitate foreign investment,
such as elimination of the ban on foreign investment in certain sensitive industries, and




Under the repealed Foreign Investment Law, all FJVs were required
to obtain a permit from the Foreign Investment Agency (FIA). 182 The
FIA reserved the right to refuse permission to establish an FJV, if it
believed the FJV would harm the economic, environmental, or security
interests of the state.188 Communist law did not require that the agency
provide an explanation for its denial of a permit, nor did it allow the
appeal of such a denial.18 This permit requirement was manipulated
by protectionists within the Foreign Investment Agency to delay and
deny formation of FJVs. 185
The New Foreign Investment Law dissolves the FIA 86 and elimi-
nates the need for a permit for most FJVs. 187 Pursuant to newly en-
acted law, permits are required if an FJV: operates ports; engages in
real estate transactions; conducts business in the defense industry; im-
ports consumer goods; or provides legal services. 88 Permits for trans-
ferring assets are required if a state-owned company"", contributes non-
monetary capital in exchange for shares of stock in an FJV. 00 Simi-
larly, permits are required for most transactions involving the purchase
182. Law Governing Economic Activities With the Participation of Foreign Parties
(Dec. 28, 1989) (as amended) arts. 4.1, 5.1, 5.4 [hereinafter Old Joint Venture Law].
To obtain a permit under prior law, investors were required to submit the following: a
description of the partners; a recital of the object and scope of the venture; a statement
of the period of operation; a description of financing arrangements and initial capitali-
zation; the form of each investor's contribution; and the seat of the FJV and its place of
business. Id. at arts. 10.1, 10.2, 11.1. In addition, investors were required to provide a
feasibility study and documentation on the legal and financial status of each prospec-
tive investor. Id. at art. 10.2, §§ 2, 3.
183. Id. at art. 6.1.
184. Id. at arts. 6.2, 6.4.
185. Poland Weighing Investment Law Changes to Correct Problems in Current
Program, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 283 (Feb. 20, 1991).
186. New Polish Investment Law, supra note 175, at art. 41, §§ 1-2. The New
Polish Investment Law dissolves the office of the FIA president and the FIA itself, and
transfers their powers to the Minister of Ownership Transformations. Id. This ministry
was originally created to oversee the privatization of state-owned companies. Id. See
also id. at art. 42, §§ 1-2 (establishing a State Foreign Investment Agency as a joint
stock company for the purpose of organizing and inspiring foreign investment in
Poland).
187. See id. at art. 4 (indicating when a permit to establish a company is required).
188. Id. at art. 4, § 1.
189. See Slupinski, Summary of Joint Venture Legislation in Poland, INT'L Bus.
LAWYER, Oct. 1990, at 403 [hereinafter Slupinski] (explaining that the Law on Priva-
tization of State Enterprises provides for a two step process: 1) state enterprises will
take the form of wholly state-owned companies with all stock owned by the treasury of
Poland; 2) shares will be sold to domestic or foreign private parties).
190. New Polish Investment Law, supra note 175, at art. 4, § 2. This permit re-
quirement was, perhaps, designed to prevent sales of state-owned assets from being
negotiated at inappropriate prices by incompetent or corrupt management. Id. at arts.
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or lease of property owned by an SOE. 1 1 For those FJVs that still
must obtain permits, the requirements are far more lenient, and feasi-
bility studies are no longer required.19 2
Although the New Foreign Investment Law states that the old per-
mits are still valid, it allows the Minister of Ownership Transforma-
tions to adjust conditions in the old permits to the more lenient provi-
sions of the new law.193
B. PROTECTION AGAINST EXPROPRIATION OF INVESTMENTS
While the New Foreign Investment Law does not altogether prevent
the expropriation of foreign investments, it does provide an explicit
guarantee of proportional compensation for actual damages suffered as
a result of expropriation,194 or for acts having the effect of expropria-
tion.1 95 The new law empowers the investor to convert and repatriate
expropriation payments, provided that the investor's home country
grants similar protection to Polish investors.' 98
C. SOURCES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Under the New Foreign Investment Law, a foreign party may only
contribute to the capital of an FJV in Polish currency1 97 obtained
through the sale of hard currency to a foreign exchange bank at the
official rate set by the National Bank of Poland. 98 Dividends derived
from Polish investments, funds obtained from the sale of FJV shares,
and funds acquired from the liquidation of an FJV, are all permissible
4 § 2, 6 § 3, 12 § 2. The new law is rife with special licensing and permit requirements
for FJVs which deal with state-owned companies in any way.
191. Id. at art. 6, § 1(3).
192. See id. at art. 16, § 2 (explaining that the Minister of Ownership Transforma-
tion can impose conditions on those obtaining permits for these FJVs, including man-
dating the distribution of shares and votes among investors via provisions in the corpo-
rate bylaws).
193. Id. at art. 43, § 2.
194. Id. at art. 22, § 1. Poland's guarantee falls short of ensuring against expropri-
ation, as do those of the CSFR and Hungary. Id. See Czech Foreign Investment Act,
supra note 14 (describing the Czechoslovakian guarantee for payment of actual dam-
ages); supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (describing the same). See also Hun-
garian Investment Act, supra note 101 (describing Hungary's investment protection
regime, featuring full and immediate repayment of damages); supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text (describing the same).
195. New Polish Investment Law, supra note 175, at art. 22, § 1.
196. See id. (stating that compensation provisions are based on the principle of
reciprocity).
197. Id. at art. 10, § 1(1). The zloty is Poland's form of currency.
198. New Polish Investment Law, supra note 175, at art. 10, § l(l).
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sources of Polish currency for investment."" Non-monetary contribu-
tions to capital may include imported assets and assets obtained with
Polish currency obtained through the sale of hard currency. 00 Alterna-
tively, the Minister of Finance is empowered to issue special permits to
allow the use of Polish currency obtained from other sources. 0 1
The New Foreign Investment Law abandons the requirement that
the foreign investor contribute at least twenty-five million zlotys to the
initial capital of the company.20 2 Consequently, there is no minimum or
maximum level of capital contribution or of ownership percentage of
the foreign partner. The new law eliminates an intriguing but rarely
used alternative form of financing: debt-equity swaps.20 3 The Polish
government justified the elimination of this alternative based on the
belief that printing new currency would increase the money supply and
cause inflation. 201 A more likely explanation for the elimination of the
debt-equity swaps is that the swaps create a demand for Polish debt,
and create a corresponding market value for the debt at a time when
Poland is actively lobbying for foreign banks to write-off eighty percent
of its forty-six billion dollar foreign debt as uncollectible..20  Banks will
not write-off loans if the loans may be sold to investors who intend to
swap the debt for Polish companies or for state-owned assets. Poland is
placed in a far more advantageous position if it is able to sell its assets
for cash and, at the same time, receive forgiveness of a large portion of
its loans. 06
199. Id. at art. 10, § 2.
200. Id. at art. 10, § 1(2).
201. Id. at art. 10, § 3.
202. Old Joint Venture Law, supra note 182, at art. 16.4.
203. See Law on Economic Activity with the Participation of Foreign Parties (Dec.
28, 1989), reprinted in BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 11, app. P-I (defining debt-to-
equity swaps as situations in which an investor acquires outstanding debts owed by the
Polish government to a foreign lender). The debt is usually purchased at a steep dis-
count. Comment, International Debt-to-Equity Swaps, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507, 507(1987). The investor then trades the debt for assets, or shares in a Polish-owned com-
pany. Maktouf, Some Reflections on Debt-for-Equity Conversions, 23 INT'L LAW 909.
909 (1989). The trade is for the face value of the debt. Id. Poland benefits by a reduc-
tion in outstanding debt and corresponding service payments in hard currency. Id. at
910. The investor benefits from the discounted cost of the debt. Id. at 914.
204. Slupinski, supra note 189, at 402. If the Polish government restricted the
swaps to debt-for-equity, rather than debt-for-cash, then this argument would fail.
205. Poland and the International Monetary Fund, 8 INT'L. TADE REP. (BNA)
No. 9, at 332 (Feb. 27, 1991).
206. See Slupinski, supra note 189, at 402. Poland secured loan agreements with
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to support its economic restruc-
turing program. Id. Debt-for-equity swaps were never permitted in any large invest-
ment cases, and were only rarely used in small investment cases. Id.
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D. CONVERTIBILITY AND REPATRIATION OF PROFITS
In accordance with the terms of the recently-ratified Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty with the United States,10 the New Foreign Investment
Law permits full convertibility and repatriation of profits and invest-
ments.20 8 In contrast, prior law only permitted full convertibility and
repatriation of profits earned in foreign trade, and a partial repatriation
of profits earned inside Poland. 09 Under the new law, in order to con-
vert Polish profits into hard currency, an investor must obtain a certifi-
cate issued by the Minister of Finance verifying the investor's share of
the company's profits. 210 No permit is required to repatriate the prof-
its.21' Polish currency obtained from the sale of shares or through the
liquidation of an FJV may be converted to hard currency without the
issuance of a certificate or permit.
21 2
Foreign employees of FJVs are entitled to convert all wages into
hard currency by presenting a company-issued certificate specifying the
amount of wages earned.213 The employees may then repatriate their
wages without a permit.214
E. TAX ISSUES
The Old Foreign Investment Law provided for a forty percent corpo-
rate tax rate216 with a three-year tax holiday 216 for FJVs in certain
preferred sectors. The New Foreign Investment Law, however, reduces
the availability of the tax holiday.21 Under the New Foreign Invest-
207. See The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Poland Concerning Business and Economic Relations, art. V, S. TREATY Doc. No. 18,
101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 6-7 (1990) [hereinafter Polish BIT].
208. New Polish Investment Law, supra note 175, at arts. 25-26.
209. See Slupinski, supra note 189, at 402.
210. New Polish Investment Law, supra note 175, at art. 25. The Minister of Fi-
nance issues the certificate upon review of an audit of the FJV's records. Id. at art. 25,
11.
211. Id. at art. 25, 2.
212. Id. at art. 26.
213. Id. at art. 28, T 1.214. Id. at art. 28, 11 2.
215. Slupinski, supra note 189, at 402.
216. Old Joint Venture Law, supra note 182, at art. 28.1. A tax holiday exempts a
company from paying any income tax for a fixed term. M. GLAUTIER & F. BASSINGER,
A REFERENCE GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 160 (1987). These holidays are
granted in order to make investments by foreigners more appealing. Id.
217. New Polish Investment Law, supra note 175, at art. 23. The government re-
duced the availability of the holiday because many Polish companies actively sought
nominal foreign investment in order to qualify. Tokarczyk & Webb, The New Polish
Foreign Investment Law, 5 LAW & BUSINESS INSIGHTS, (P-H) 9, 30 (Sept. 1991).
Thus, Poland's goal of increasing foreign investment was only marginally served. Id.
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ment Law, exemptions for preferred economic activities are no longer
automatic.218 To qualify for the tax holiday, foreign investors must con-
tribute at least two million ECUs211 to the FJV, and the FJV must
either operate in an area with extremely high unemployment, obtain
important new technologies, or export at least twenty percent of its pro-
duction.2 0 FJVs formed after December 31, 1993, are not entitled to
the tax holiday.221 The annual tax exemption from a tax holiday may
not exceed the amount initially invested.222 The Minister of Finance
may require concessions in exchange for granting a tax holiday,223 or
may refuse the exemption for important economic reasons.2 If the ini-
tial capitalization of a company is reduced, or if liquidation proceed-
ings commence within two years after the expiration of the holiday, the
full amount of exempted taxes become due immediately. 22"
Poland and the United States have a double-taxation treaty which
protects international investors from paying full taxes on profits in both
the country of investment and in the investor's home country.220 Under
the terms of this treaty, Poland taxes an American investor's earnings
218. New Polish Investment Law, supra note 175, at art. 38. The limited tax ex-
emptions retained in the New Foreign Investment Law are not available to already-
formed companies. Id. at arts. 34, 38. These companies will continue to enjoy their
existing holidays. Id. If a company chooses to reorganize for any reason, it will not be
entitled to continue the tax holiday, unless it qualifies under the new provisions. Id. at
art. 37, 3.
219. Id. at art. 23, 1 (1). ECUs are the European Economic Community's form of
currency. Regulation of International Finance, Resolution of the European Council on
the Establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) and Related Matters,
Basic Documents Int'l Econ. L. (CCH) 457 (1990).
220. Id. at art. 23, 1(2).
221. Id. at art. 23, 3.
222. Id. at art. 23, % 6.
223. Id. at art. 23, 2.
224. Id. The translator of the New Polish Investment Law contends that much of
the language of the new law is purposely vague, in an effort to provide the Polish
government with a high degree of flexibility in its application. Id. Such latitude permits
the government to deny an exemption to an FJV that it suspects retained a foreign
investor for the sole purpose of avoiding taxes, and to terminate the exemption program
because of "important economic reasons." See Slupinski, The New Polish Joint Ven-
ture Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 16 (noting that subsequent legislation is expected to
clarify and supplement the new law).
225. Id. at art. 24.
226. See Convention on the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, with Related Notes, Oct. 8, 1974,
United States-Poland., art. 20, 28 U.S.T. 891, 919 [hereinafter Polish Tax Treaty]
(providing profits from American investments in Poland with protection from double
taxation). See also supra note 53 (discussing double taxation and tax neutrality).
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at the rate of fifteen percent, unless the investor owns at least ten per-
cent of an FJV, in which case the tax rate is five percent. 27
F. PRIVATIZATION OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES
In July of 1990, the Polish Sjem passed the New Privatization
Law,22 8 which provides the legal foundation for the privatization of
state-owned companies. Implementation of the privatization process
was left to the executive branch of the Polish government, 22 9 which,
like the CSFR,23 ° adopted a plan dividing SOEs into large and small
categories.23' The Polish government is developing a list of approxi-
mately four hundred large companies that it intends to privatize.13 2
The Minister of Transformations will distribute shares of these compa-
nies to employees, Polish citizens above the age of majority, and the
Polish government.2 3 Beginning in 1993, shares acquired by Poles will
227. Polish Tax Treaty, supra note 226, at arts. 11, 1 2(a),(b). Under prior foreign
investment law, all repatriated profits were taxed at a rate of thirty percent. Old Joint
Venture Law, supra note 182, at art. 29. Due to tax treaty provisions, however, Ameri-
can investors were not subject to the thirty percent rate. See supra note 53 (discussing
double taxation and tax neutrality).
228. The State Enterprise Privatization Act, Rzeczpospolita No. 169, (July 23,
1990) [hereinafter Polish Privatization Act].
229. Id. at art. 2.1, § 1.
230. See supra notes 55-92 and accompanying text (describing the CSFR's ap-
proach to privatization). Unlike the CSFR, Poland has not incorporated its property
restitution program into its privatization program. Poland's Reprivatization Initiative
Designed to Pay For Communist Era Losses, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 25, at
951 (June 19, 1991). This has hampered efforts to sell privatized companies to inves-
tors, who are unwilling to buy or lease assets without clear title. Id. The Polish govern-
ment is working on legislation that would settle restitution claims within a year. Id.
231. See Polish Government Program for Privatization of Polish Economy, art. I, §
1 (NTIS Central & Eastern European Legal Texts) Dec. 1990 available in LEXIS,
Europe Law Library, Law File [hereinafter Privatization Program] (describing the
plan to categorize Polish firms as either large, small, or medium-size enterprises).
232. See Mass Privatization Program, POLISH NEws BULLETIN, July 27, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (interview with Junusz Lewandowski,
Minister of Ownership Transformations) [hereinafter Lewandowski] (reserving priva-
tization for the best performing companies). Before shares are distributed, the State
Treasury assumes ownership of each enterprise as the sole shareholder. Id.
233. Id. The current plan provides employees with approximately ten percent of the
authorized shares, allows the government to retain thirty percent, and distributes sixty
percent to all Polish citizens through "National Wealth Management Funds." Id. Each
adult Polish citizen receives shares in the funds which operate like western-style mutual
funds. Id. The funds maintain their own boards under the authority of the Polish gov-
ernment. Id. Polish citizens are not permitted to sell their shares in these funds until
1993. Id.
Given the wide distribution and low concentration of ownership in these funds, it is
unlikely that Polish citizens or entrepreneurs will influence the decision-making pro-
cess, either in the funds or in the companies. Barbara Blaszczyk & Marek Dabrowski,
Mass Privatization Programme: Step into Unknown, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, July 12,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File, [hereinafter Mass Privatization
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be marketable on the Polish stock market, which began trading in
April 1991.234
The Minister of Transformations and the director of the SOE are
empowered to initiate the transformation of large SOEs.2as The direc-
tor of the SOE, however, must first obtain the approval of the employee
council.2 38 The Minister of Transformations is entitled to deny priva-
tization requests in light of important state circumstances or if the
company appears unlikely to survive. 37 If the proposed transformation
is approved, the company initially becomes a commercial corporation
with the Treasury of Poland as the sole shareholder.238 The Minister of
Transformations may then either sell the entire firm, sell shares of the
firm, or liquidate the firm's assets .2 39 The Privatization Law requires
that a company give its employees the opportunity to purchase up to
twenty percent of the firm, at half of the price charged to other Polish
citizens,240 within two months of privatization. 21 The program adopted
by the government, however, entitles employees to receive ten percent
of the stock at no cost. 242 The privatization program also allows direct
sale of large companies to major Polish and foreign investors. 3
Programme: Step into Unknown]. Hence, this plan has been criticized as being a
"mock privatization" which would result in a centrally-planned Polish economy. Id.
234. Lewandowski, supra note 232.
235. Polish Privatization Act, supra note 228, at art. 5.1. The privatization request
should include the following: an economic assessment of the viability of the company; a
draft of the articles of incorporation; and a description of preference programs for dis-
tributing shares to employees. Id. at art. 5.2.
236. Id.
237. Id. at art. 5.3. Denials are appealed in accordance with Polish law. Id. at art.
5.4.
238. Id. at art. 8.1.
239. Id. at art. 1. The sale of stock held by the Treasury must take place at a
public auction, or through negotiations based on a publicly-announced offer. Id. at art.
23.1.
240. Id. at art. 24.4. If employees do not exercise their rights to purchase stock, the
rights will terminate after one year. Id. at art. 24.3.
241. Id. at art 24.2.
242. Privatization Program, supra note 231, at art. 2.1, § 4. The government rea-
soned that, giving employees ten percent of the company for free allows them the same
benefit that they would enjoy if they purchased twenty percent of the company at half
price. Id. While the government will receive the same amount of money as for the
disposition of twenty percent of the company, the employees' control over the company
is not as great as that required by the Privatization Law. If, however, employees are
unable to pay for any stock, they are better off with the free shares.
243. Id. at art. 2.2. These privatizations would circumvent the "commercialization"
and "stock distribution" phases required for privatization of other large companies. Id.
at art. 2.2. In these direct sale cases, employees would not receive their distribution of
stock.
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Operators of small firms can elect to proceed through the same
privatization process as that of large firms. " ' Alternatively, smaller
firms may liquidate, and sell the company's assets. 24'5 The government's
privatization program calls for decentralization in the oversight of the
privatization of Poland's numerous state-owned companies.246
G. THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
The United States Senate and the Polish Sejm have both ratified a
bilateral investment treaty (BIT). 47 The BIT represents a significant
departure from the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
which have dominated United States foreign relations for nearly two
centuries. 248 The BIT deals exclusively with foreign investment and is,
consequently, easier to negotiate than the more comprehensive Treaties
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.24 9 BITs between other na-
tions have proven successful in facilitating trade and international in-
vestment.250 The United States-Poland BIT sets a new standard for
openness and favorable treatment of foreign investments. 251 The most
striking provision of the BIT is that Poland affords foreign investment
the better of Most Favored Nation or domestic treatment.252 Investors
from other nations will enjoy many of the same benefits granted to
American investors in the BIT because Poland has incorporated many
of the favorable provisions of the BIT into the new FJV law. 25 3 An-
244. Id. at arts. 3.1, 3.2.
245. Id.
246. Id. at art. 3. The privatization program, however, calls for all privatizations to
avoid inequitable management/employee takeovers which are not in the best interests
of the state. Id. at art. 3.
247. Polish BIT, supra note 207. See generally Ewing, The Treaty With Poland
Concerning Business and Economic Relations: Does It Provide More Incentive to The
American Investor?, 11 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 352 (1990) [hereinafter Ewing] (dis-
cussing the evolution of the BIT program and its relation to the Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation program).
248. Goodman, International Trade: Poland Bilateral Investment Treaty - A Re-flection of United States Efforts to Shape the Economic Development of Eastern
Europe, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 255, 255 n.2 (1991) [hereinafter Goodman]. See
Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact
on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655, 655-71 (1990)(describing the growing importance and use of BIT treaties).
249. See Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United
States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 201, 210-13 (1988) (discussing differences in negotia-
tions between FCNs and BITs).
250. See Ewing, supra note 247, at 352.
251. See Goodman, supra note 248, at 255-57 (denoting the many opportunities
made available to foreign investors through the United States-Poland BIT).
252. Id. at 256-57.
253. Id. These include: the provision for full and free convertibility and repatriation
of profits; the limitation of Poland's screening of American investors through delay or
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other important benefit of the BIT is that it requires the Polish govern-
ment to publish and make available all laws and regulations affecting
investors.2 54
Poland was the first Eastern European nation to overcome commu-
nist rule, and continues to lead in economic reform,20 5 taking bold steps
in freeing prices, allowing liberal conversion of its currency, and imple-
menting a progressive foreign investment program.2  While these mea-
sures have achieved some success, 257 actual economic improvement falls
short of expectations.258
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PERMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING A FJV
Although Poland has liberalized its requirements for establishing
FJVs, 2 " Hungary's laws allowing the formation of FJVs without a per-
mit are the most facilitating in Eastern Europe.2 0 By contrast, the
CSFR still requires all FJVs to obtain permits from the Federal Minis-
try of Finance. 61 While the CSFR readily grants these permits and in
some cases automatically issues required licenses,262 these impediments
allow for discrimination in the issuance of permits, and may discourage
or divert interested investors. Governments should nurture domestic en-
trepreneurs through assistance programs, but should not inhibit foreign
investment through discriminatory organizational requirements.
refusal of FJV permits; and more favorable terms for compensating investors in the
case of the expropriation of property. Id.
254. Polish BIT, supra note 207, at art. VIII. It is essential that investors receive
timely information regarding the substance and impact of new laws due to the ongoing
change in Eastern European business law. Id.
255. Catch-22, supra note 12, 5-9.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 9. Poland's hyperinflation has been reduced to eighty percent, a stock
market has been established, and private businesses are generating forty percent of
gross domestic product. Id.
258. Id. Despite Poland's "big bang" approach to economic reform, it appears that
additional liberalization is still needed. Id.
259. See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text (describing Poland's recently-
implemented permit requirements).
260. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text (discussing Hungarian re-
quirements for establishing an FJV). Hungary requires that an FJV register and com-
ply with the same standards for incorporation that apply to domestic Hungarian firms.
Id.
261. See supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text (describing the requirements
for obtaining a permit in the CSFR).
262. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (evaluating the CSFR's policy
for the granting of permits and licenses).
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B. PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS
All three countries provide basic protections against expropriation of
private property, and require full compensation for actual loss suffered
as a result of expropriation."' Hungary, however, extends guarantees
of payment to governmental actions with "similar effects" to expropria-
tion in addition to physical takings of property. 4 Furthermore, Hun-
gary has the best record for redressing losses incurred in the early years
of communist rule, and actually settled all American claims in 1973.20
In addition to the protections against expropriation, each of these
countries has entered into a BIT with the United States, further pro-
tecting American investors.266 The BIT between Poland and the United
States is the most progressive, granting American investors the better
of national treatment or Most Favored Nation status.16 7 This BIT also
requires the Polish government to inform American investors proac-
tively of changes in laws and of the resulting implications for busi-
ness.2 8 Given typical language and legal differences between an inves-
tor's home country and the host country, such provisions benefit foreign
investors in any country. In light of the accelerated pace of the evolu-
tion of commercial law in these nations, such a stipulation by the host
government seems indispensable. The CSFR and Hungary should pro-
vide similar services to investors.
C. CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY AND REPATRIATION
Each of these nations recognizes the beneficial impact that free con-
vertibility of currency would have on trade and investment. The need to
control inflation and to build sufficient hard currency reserves to sup-
port a freely-traded currency, however, requires governments to care-
263. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing the CSFR's expro-
priation laws). See also supra notes 108-I 1 and accompanying text (describing Hun-
gary's expropriation laws); supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (evaluating Po-
land's expropriation laws).
264. Hungarian Investment Act, supra note 101 at §§ 1(2)-(4).
265. See JOHNSON, supra note 103, at 10 (discussing Hungary's policy for the set-
tlement of American debts).
266. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the treaty with the
CSFR). See also supra note 110 and accompanying text (analyzing the treaty with
Hungary); supra notes 247-54 and accompanying text (discussing the treaty with
Poland).
267. Supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 254 and accompanying text (noting that the Polish government
is required to inform foreign investors of changes in business laws).
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fully phase-in free convertibility. 2 9 Poland has adopted the most liberal
conversion and repatriation laws in Eastern Europe, allowing full con-
vertibility and repatriation of profits, investments, and wages of foreign
nationals.27 0 The CSFR's laws are slightly more restrictive, requiring
FJVs and their employees to convert all hard currency into the local
currency, but allowing FJVs to obtain permits to convert local currency
back into hard currency for most hard currency expenses, and allowing
conversion and repatriation of all profits and proceeds from the sale or
liquidation of investments. 71 Moreover, the CSFR allows employees to
convert and repatriate all of their after-tax wages. 2  Hungary, how-
ever, limits the amount an employee may repatriate to fifty percent of
wages, and prohibits repatriation of profits from the sale of an invest-
ment.273 Hungary should take steps to liberalize conversion and repatri-
ation rules, in order to keep pace with Poland and the CSFR.
D. TAX IsSUES
Initially all of these countries offered tax incentives to encourage in-
vestment. 4 Each, however, has moved to reduce or eliminate the avail-
ability of these tax breaks. 27 5 The United States' tax neutrality ap-
proach to taxation of profits from international investments eliminates
most of the benefits of tax incentives to American investors.27 6 Further-
more, the lower taxes represent a loss to the treasury of the host coun-
try, and a gain to the government of the investor's home country.
269. See generally Currency Reform, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1990 at 21-24 (de-
tailing the importance of convertible currency and providing a history of currency con-
version standards).
270. See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text (discussing Poland's newly-
adopted conversion and repatriation rules).
271. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text (describing the CSFR's laws
governing currency conversion and repatriation).
272. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (assessing conversion and repatria-
tion laws as they relate to foreign employees of FJVs).
273. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussing Hungary's limita-
tions on the repatriation of currency).
274. See Tiefenbrun, Joint Ventures in the USSR. Eastern Europe. and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China as of December 1989, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL 667, 690
(1989) (describing the 1989 Hungarian FJV investment tax incentives). See also id. at
707 (describing Poland's 1989 FJV tax incentives).
275. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (describing the CSFR's FJV
tax). See also supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (describing Hungary's recent
FJV tax changes); supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text (describing Poland's re-
cent FJV tax changes); Hungary Proposes Plan to Abolish Tax Incentives for Foreign
Investors, 8 IN"L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 45, 1651 (Nov. 13, 1991) (disclosing Hun-
gary's plan to withdraw tax incentives and the International Monetary Fund's disap-
proval of the use of tax incentives to encourage foreign investment).
276. See supra note 53 (discussing the topic of tax neutrality).
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Currently, the CSFR has the lowest tax rates for FJVs, with rates of
between twenty and forty percent of income. 77 The CSFR's tax sys-
tem, however, is extremely complicated, and, for companies lacking
sufficient foreign capitalization, the rates can reach ninety percent.
Moreover, the lack of a tax treaty with the United States subjects
American investors to double taxation of profits earned in the CSFR.2 7 8
Given the effects of tax neutrality, the CSFR's lower tax rates offer no
advantage to foreign investors, and the complexity of its tax system
serves as a competitive disadvantage in the race to attract foreign
investors.
To encourage foreign investment, these nations should strive to sim-
plify their tax structures and to avoid excessive tax rates. Given tax
neutrality and double taxation treaties, tax incentives are only effective
in stimulating investment by domestic citizens.
E. PRIVATIZATION
Rapid privatization of state-owned companies is essential to estab-
lishing a healthy market-driven economy. Hungary boasts the most
successful record in its privatization efforts, with approximately fifty
thousand newly-privatized companies, 27 9 producing one-third of gross
domestic product.2 " Hungary's approach to the privatization process is
the most practical in the region, avoiding the use of complex and time-
consuming methods of distributing shares.28' Instead, Hungary distrib-
utes shares to local governments,28 2 and sells all remaining shares to
the highest bidder.28 3 Hungary has managed to overcome public suspi-
cion and criticism of the privatization process by establishing an inde-
pendent agency that enforces minimal, but effective, guidelines,
designed to ensure that state assets are not "given away" by incompe-
tent or corrupt management. 84
277. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (describing the CSFR's taxa-
tion system).
278. Id.
279. High Risks and Rewards Cited in Eastern and Central Europe, 8 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 39, 1447 (Oct. 2, 1991).
280. See Catch 22, supra note 12, at 5, 9 (assessing economic conditions in
Hungary).
281. See supra notes 142-69 and accompanying text (outlining Hungary's priva-
tization program).
282. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (describing the requirement for
payment to local governments).
283. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text (describing procedures




In contrast, both Poland and the CSFR require the distribution of
shares of newly-privatized companies to public citizens.2 85 Although
Poland and the CSFR have both adopted privatization programs fea-
turing similar independent agencies, there is still widespread mistrust
of the privatization process in these countries.286 Such negative public
perception is, perhaps, the result of more oppressive communist govern-
ments prior to 1989, and is indicative of the structural societal obsta-
cles to reform in these countries.
CONCLUSION
These Eastern European nations have demonstrated remarkable
commitment to political and economic reform. They have taken deci-
sive steps toward the conversion of inefficient centrally-directed econo-
mies into more efficient market-driven economies. Each step, however,
displaces workers in inefficient industries. For this reason, many reform
laws and initiatives refrain from allowing the free market to completely
displace central government control. Such reluctance temporarily mini-
mizes, but ultimately prolongs, the economic hardships accompanying
reform. As a result, reform efforts have not produced the quick results
desired. In fact, unemployment 287 and inflation are on an upsurge,288
and GNP has fallen eight percent in each of the last two years.289 Such
disappointing results will tend to support calls for curtailing economic
reforms. The benefits of a free market economy cannot be realized,
however, until the economy is truly free and truly directed by market
forces. At this point, each nation should accelerate the privatization
process, permitting shareholders and shop owners to force managers
and workers to become more efficient, unleashing the driving force
these economies so urgently need.
285. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing the CSFR's use of a
voucher system to distribute ownership of companies to citizens). See also supra note
233 and accompanying text (describing Poland's plan to distribute shares in holding
funds to Polish citizens).
286. See Business in Eastern Europe, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing the cynicism
surrounding the change to a capitalistic market and the growing perceptions that priva-
tization brings corruption).
287. Id. at 4.
288. Id.
289. Id.
1992]
